Compelling Parties to Mediate Investor-State Disputes: No Pressure, No Diamonds? by Claxton, James M.
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
Volume 20 Issue 1 Article 4 
4-20-2020 
Compelling Parties to Mediate Investor-State Disputes: No 
Pressure, No Diamonds? 
James M. Claxton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and 
the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James M. Claxton, Compelling Parties to Mediate Investor-State Disputes: No Pressure, No Diamonds?, 
20 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 78 (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol20/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized editor of Pepperdine 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , 
anna.speth@pepperdine.edu. 
 78 
COMPELLING PARTIES TO MEDIATE 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: NO PRESSURE, 
NO DIAMONDS? 
*James M. Claxton 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
There are few areas of international law that are more dynamic, or more fraught 
with controversy, than investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).  In its most common 
form, ISDS empowers investors to arbitrate claims against states hosting their 
investments on the basis of entitlements in treaties.1  This system has been called 
“dramatically different from anything previously known in the international sphere.”2 
Not only do investment treaties grant corporate and private investors international 
legal rights, aberrant to classical international law, but those rights are enforceable 
under arbitration agreements in the treaties to which the investors are evidently not 
party.3  This system has captured public attention, and sometimes drawn ire, with 
notorious cases like the Yukos arbitration against Russia for claims of more than 
$114 billion and cigarette-packaging arbitrations brought by Philip Morris against 
Australia and Uruguay.4   
                                            
* Professor of Law, Rikkyo University School of Law.  
1 See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 237-38 (1995). 
2 Id. at 256. 
3 In investment treaties, the home state of the investor and state hosting the investment agree that investors can 
arbitrate claims.  Consent in a given arbitration can be thought of as two-stage process: the respondent state 
consents in the treaty and the claimant investor consents by filing a notice of arbitration once a dispute has 
arisen or by otherwise notifying the state of its consent.  The same principle can explain the operation of 
consent under domestic investment laws that provide for arbitration.  E.g., Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Investment Treaties, ¶¶ 12.2, 12.3 (Sep. 16, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 240 (2007).   
4 See Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russ. Fed’n, PCA Case Repository No. AA 227, Final Award ¶ 63 
(July 18, 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/420; Philip Morris Brad Sarl (Switz.), Philip Morris 
Products S.A. (Switz.), and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7, Cigarette Packaging, (July 8, 2016), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf; Philip Morris Asia 
Ltd. V. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case Repository No. 2012-12, Final Award Regarding Costs (July 8, 
2017), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2190.   
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Supporters may argue that investment protections can encourage stable, long-
term investments, strengthen the rule of law, and promote economic development.  
From this perspective, arbitration ensures that treaty protections are meaningful by 
offering a venue for enforcing investor rights outside of the courts of the host state.  
Critics argue that the special entitlements that the treaties confer on corporations can 
have unintended consequences, including preferential state treatment of foreign 
investors and the “chilling” of state regulation for the public good as governments 
and administrative agencies allow fear of investor claims to shape their policies.5  
Critics also denounce investor-state arbitration as illegitimate in part because it 
empowers private individuals, often corporate lawyers, to sit in judgement of the acts 
of public authorities.6 
Criticisms of the investment law system have led stakeholders, including the 
European Union (EU) and United Nations (U.N.), to explore systemic reforms that 
include the use of mediation as an alternative or compliment to other forms of 
dispute resolution.7  Mediation tends to be faster, less expensive, and more conducive 
to preserving relations between parties.8  This initiative coincides with a steady 
global awakening to the potential of mediation including the introduction of 
mandatory mediation in various domestic court systems, 9  an EU Directive on 
mediation,10 prioritization of mediation to resolve “Belt and Road” disputes,11 and 
the signing of the Singapore Convention, the first-ever international mediation treaty, 
in August 2019.12 
                                            
5 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD’s Reform Package for the International 
Investment Regime 48-52 (2018), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/publications/1190/unctad-s-reform-
package-for-the-international-investment-regime-2018-edition- (last visited 24 August 2019) [hereinafter 
Reform Package].  
6 Id. at 48.  See generally UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note: Reforming Investment Dispute Settlement: A Stocktaking 
(March 2019),  
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d3_en.pdf (surveying of issues and proposed reforms). 
7 See European Commission, Consultation Document, Prevention and Amicable Resolution of Disputes Between 
Investors and Public Authorities Within the Single Market, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (July-Nov. 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-investment-protection-mediation-consultation-document_en_1.pdf 
[hereinafter Prevention and Amicable Resolution]; Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Working Group 
III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, Possible Reform of ISDS - Cost and Duration,§60, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153 (Aug. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Possible Reform] (“[t]he Working Group may wish to 
note that despite increasing efforts to promote forms of dispute settlement other than arbitration, such as 
mediation, still remain under-used in ISDS”). 
8 The Advantages of Mediation Cases Over Traditional Lawsuits, FINDLAW, 
https://adr.findlaw.com/mediation/the-advantages-of-mediation-cases-over-traditional-lawsuits.html, (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2019).   
9 See infra Part VI (discussing mandatory mediation and its variations in domestic legal system).   
10 Council Directive 2008/52, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 136).   
11 Guidance Notes on Resolving Belt and Road Disputes Using Mediation and Arbitration, ICC: INT’L 
CHAMBER OF COM., https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-guidance-mediation-belt-road-disputes, (last visited 24 
August 2019).  See generally Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Fan Kun, Integrating Mediation into Arbitration: 
Why It Works in China, 25 J. OF INT’L ARB. 479, 479 (2008); Kim M. Rooney, Turning the Rivalrous Relations 
Between Arbitration and Mediation into Cooperative or Convergent Modes of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
for Commercial Disputes in East Asia, 12 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 107 (2019).   
12 G.A. Res. 73/198, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2018). 
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Yet resistance to investor-state mediation runs deep and is complicated by 
structural and political barriers.13  This includes the reluctance of state agents facing 
investor claims to agree to settle those claims out of fear that voluntary settlement 
may suggest weakness, corruption, or deference to foreign investors, all of which 
may come at high political cost to the agent.14  This conundrum raises questions that 
are familiar to domestic lawmakers: Should parties be compelled to mediate?  If so, 
what form should compulsions take?  
This article surveys the merits and demerits of compulsions in the investor-state 
context.  It concludes that a range of compulsions at various pressure points by 
diverse stakeholders would help to overcome obstacles to investor-state mediation 
and result in greater satisfaction with ISDS while enhancing the legitimacy of the 
system.  
The article will proceed as follows: Part II provides the historical context to 
international investment law and the use of mediation to resolve investor-state 
disputes; Part III considers the advantages of mediation compared to arbitration; Part 
IV examines the reasons that mediation has not been used more often to resolve 
investor-state disputes; Part V considers recent initiatives to promote the use of 
international mediation; Part VI provides an overview of compulsions to mediate in 
domestic legal systems; Part VII examines how incentives and compulsions to 
mediate might be integrated into the ISDS system; Part VIII surveys conceptual and 
practical problems with compulsion to mediate; and Part IX concludes by proposing 
an approach to compulsions in ISDS that might be achievable. 
 
II.   HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
A. The Genesis of International Investment Law 
 
The modern system of investment law has roots in the treatment of foreigners 
and their property by foreign states.15  From the Middle Ages, parties that were 
mistreated abroad relied on their home states to take up their grievances with the 
states where the harm occurred.16  Provided that the governments were willing to get 
involved, claims were resolved at the state level by negotiations and sometimes by 
claims commission and arbitral tribunals.17  This system of “diplomatic protection” 
                                            
13 Daniel Weinstein & Mushegh Manukyan, Making Mediation More Attractive for Investor-State Disputes, 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2019), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/03/26/making-
mediation-more-attractive-for-investor-state-disputes/.   
14 Seraphina Chew, Lucy Reed, & J. Christopher Thomas QC, Report: Survey on Obstacles to Settlement of 
Investor-State Disputes, CTR. FOR INT’L L., NAT’L U. OF SING., (Sept. 2018), https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/NUS-CIL-Working-Paper-1801-Report-Survey-on-Obstacles-to-Settlement-of-
Investor-State-Disputes.pdf. 
15 Francis J. Nicholson S.J., The Protection of Foreign Property Under Customary International Law, 6 B.C.L. 
REV. 391, 391 (1965). 
16 DINAH L. SHELTON, REGIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2010). 
17 Id. at 2. 
3
Claxton: Compelling Parties to Mediate Investor-State Disputes
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2020
 81 
contributed to the development of some customary law standards of treatment of 
aliens both in procedural rights and substantive rights, including the nature of fair 
treatment and compensation for legal expropriation.18  
A lack of legal certainty about these standards and gaps in protection led to the 
conclusion of contracts and eventually treaties with provisions on investment 
protection.19  The practice of concluding bilateral and multilateral investment treaties 
took off after World War II amidst increasing international economic integration.20  
Throughout this time, there have been various unsuccessful attempts to create a 
centralized system of international investment law and dispute resolution as exists for 
international trade under the World Trade Organization.21  In the 1960s, notably, a 
draft multilateral treaty with a catalog of investor protections was prepared under the 
auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).22  While the treaty never entered into force, its text has proven to be an 
influential reference of substantive and procedural standards for states concluding 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.23  At the time of this writing, there were 
2,898 such investment treaties and 389 instruments with investor protections.24 
 
B. The Genesis (and Exodus) of Investment Mediation 
 
It is a remarkable fact that the spread of arbitration to resolve investor-state 
disputes has its genesis in international mediation.25  In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly “World Bank”) 
administered conciliations of high-profile investment disputes including Iran’s 
nationalization of its oil industry, Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company, and a financial dispute between the city of Tokyo and French bond 
                                            
18 For additional historic context see, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 500 
(6th ed. 2003); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 1-73 (2009); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 88-123 (2d ed. 2015). 
19 Eustace Chikere Azubuike, The Place of Treaties in International Investment, 19 ANN. SURV. OF INT’L & 
COMP. L. 155, 155-56 (2013).   
20 Id. at 158-61. 
21 Id. at 171.  
22 CSABA KOVÁCS, ATTRIBUTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW § 1.03 (2018). 
23 Id. at § 1.03. 
24 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub: International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements (last visited Oct. 28, 2019). These 
numbers will continue to be updated, so it would best serve the reader to check the most current numbers.  Id. 
25 Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Indiv. Disp. (ICSID), History of the ICSID Convention II-1 6 (1968), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/History%20of%20ICSID%20Convention%20-
%20VOLUME%20II-1.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Convention History].  This article does not explore differences 
between “conciliation” and “mediation.”  The important distinction is between mediation and conciliation, on 
one hand, and arbitration, on the other, which was succinctly summed up by Aron Broches as he wrote about 
the establishment of the ICSID: “[i]n distinguishing conciliation or mediation from arbitration it has been said 
that ‘mediation recommends, arbitration decides.”  Id.  See also UNCITRAL Working Group II on the Work of 
Its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.205, at 4 (2018) (evidencing a similar lack of emphasis 
on distinctions between conciliation and mediation by replacing the former term with the latter because 
“mediation” is “a more widely-used term”).   
4
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holders.26  Based on this experience, General Counsel Aron Broches saw potential in 
the institutionalization of a standing disputes facility within the World Bank 
system.27  The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
was established on this basis with conciliation as a focal point.28  
In the first two decades of operations, ICSID actively promoted its services and 
published model clauses for conciliation and arbitration.29  Yet states showed little 
interest in ICSID’s conciliation services, much to the astonishment of Broches.30  
They instead preferred arbitration and began concluding investment contracts and 
treaties with ICSID arbitration clauses.31  These clauses sowed the seeds for a rapid 
escalation of arbitrations in the late 1990s while ICSID’s conciliation facility went 
mostly unused.32  This trend has continued to the present day with consistent 
increases in the number of arbitrations registered at ICSID and no appreciable 
increase in the number of conciliations.33  
 
C. Consequences of the Rise in Arbitration   
 
The predominance of the use of arbitration to resolve investor-state disputes has 
contributed to the development of the practice and an understanding of its features.  
A corps of stakeholders has formed from the ranks of arbitrators, lawyers, academics, 
and government officials, and institutions that support the system and hold it to 
account.34  The result of this activity has been a focalization of professional and 
public attention on arbitration as a means of resolving investor-state disputes.35  
                                            
26 ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID 22-23 (2d ed. 2017).  In these instances, conciliation was used 
instead of arbitration because the World Bank did not want to assume responsibility for imposing a binding 
decision on the parties.  Id.  
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 23-24, 123 n.104. 
29 See generally id.  
30 See generally id. 
31 See generally id. 
32 See generally id. 
33 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics 2019-2 8, ICSID (2019), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ICSID_Web_Stats_2019-2_(English).pdf.  By the end of June 2019, 
there have been only 12 ICSID conciliations over the history of its operations with no meaningful increase in 
conciliations over time.  During the same period, ICSID has registered 728 arbitrations under the ICSID 
Convention and Additional Facility Rules.  Of course, these figures do not tell the whole story as there have 
been mediations of investor-state disputes that were not administered under the ICSID Conciliation Rules; the 
precise number of investor-state mediations is elusive given that mediations are normally confidential.  Id.   
34 See Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L. 
J. 459, 464-65 (2015).  
35 Concerning popular attention, in the English-language press alone the phenomenon of investor-state 
arbitration has been the subject of attention by the New York Times, The Economist, the Washington Post, and 
the Wall Street Journal.  Franck & Wylie, supra note 33, at 463-464 (2015); see also Luke Nottage, 
International Arbitration and Society at Large, CAMBRIDGE COMPENDIUM OF INT’L COM. & INV. ARB. (Andrea 
Bjorklund, Franco Ferrari, & Stefan Kroll, eds.) (forthcoming 2019) (available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3116528) (considering how engagement with society renders international arbitration 
more visible and promotes its expansion). 
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The history of mediation of investor-state disputes has been less animated.  Due 
to various factors considered later in this article, the practice of investor-state 
mediation and its benefits are not always well defined or understood.  Perceived 
differences in the role of the mediator and assumptions based on domestic mediation 
practice may exacerbate the uncertainty.  Meanwhile, the community of investor-
state mediation stakeholders is small with a comparatively limited number of 
qualified mediators who have experience with disputes between investors and states.  
 
III.   COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF MEDIATION 
 
In the arbitration between Achmea and the Slovak Republic, the tribunal made 
an uncustomary remark to the parties at the close of the hearing on the merits: 
[A] settlement in this case would be a good thing, in that the aims approximately 
aligned, and that the black and white solution of a legal decision in which one side 
wins and the other side loses is not the optimum outcome in this case . . . should the 
Parties desire to seek out somebody who might act as a mediator or reconciliator, the 
Secretary-General of the PCA might be in a position to assist.36  
Despite this observation, the parties did not attempt mediation but pressed 
forward in arbitration proceedings.37  There were five additional rounds of written 
submissions,38 a second arbitral hearing,39 and related proceedings at multiple levels 
of the German courts.40  The case also gave rise to proceedings before the Court of 
Justice of the EU that resulted in a judgment largely undoing the system of intra-EU 
investment treaty arbitration.41  While it cannot be said that a mediated settlement 
would have led to a better or faster outcome,42 the observation by the tribunal is a 
reminder that disputing parties, entrenched in their warring camps, may fail to see the 
potential benefits of mediation. 
Mediation is well-positioned to address dissatisfaction with investor-state 
arbitration.43  Mediation tends to have high rates of settlement and higher levels of 
                                            
36 Achmea B.V. (formerly Eureko B.V.) v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case Repository No. 2008-13, Final 
Award, ¶ 60 (Dec. 7, 2012).    
37 See generally id. 
38 These comprise one round of written submission on quantum, one round of post-hearing briefs, and three 
rounds of cost submissions.  Id. at ¶¶ 63, 70-72. 
39 Id. at ¶ 65. 
40 See id. at ¶¶ 74-75.  
41 E.g., European Commission Press Release, Single Market: Commission Welcomes Member States’ 
Commitments to Terminate All Bilateral Investment Treaties Within the EU (Jan. 17, 2019); ASA Board, The 
Cost of Achmea, 36 ASA BULL. 553, 533 (2018). 
42 The Cost of Achmea, supra note 41, at 554 (stating that “[w]hat is of concern is the series of far-reaching and 
unintended consequences that Achmea could bring about, in particular the fear that this decision, whether right 
or wrong as a matter of European law, may come at great cost not only to European investors, but to the 
European ideal itself”).  
43 See S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial Mediation, 73 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973, 2068 (1973); Anna Joubin-Bret and Barton Legum, A Set of Rules Dedicated to 
Investor-State Mediation: the IBA Investor-State Mediation Rules, 29 ICSID REV. 17, 19 (2012), 
6
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user satisfaction than adversarial forms of dispute resolution.44  The process is 
normally faster and less expensive than arbitration, a particular advantage in the 
investor-state context where the median length of arbitration proceedings is four 
years and four months, and where median costs are approximately $4.2 million for 
claimants and $3.4 million for respondents.45  Additionally, mediation addresses 
concerns about private arbitrators sitting in judgment over states because the 
disputing parties in mediation set the terms of any settlement agreement, and where 
they cannot agree, the mediator has no authority to impose a decision on them.46  
Mediation also has a higher potential than arbitration to preserve or reestablish 
business relations frayed by disputes, as the process has greater potential to be more 
collaborative than arbitration.47  This can lead to a settlement that better accounts for 
the disputing parties’ common interests.48  The advantage is amplified in investment 
disputes as investments, by their nature, call for amicable business relations over a 
longer term than many commercial transactions.49  A mediated settlement can also 
avoid reputational damage to businesses and states that might result from protracted 
and public arbitration proceedings.50  
 
IV.   UNDERUTILIZATION OF MEDIATION 
 
While the confidentiality of mediation makes it difficult to determine how 
frequently investor-state mediations take place, statistical evidence,51 experts,52 and 
                                                                                                             
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/process/IBA%20Rules%20for%20Investor-
State%20Mediation%20(Approved%20by%20IBA%20Council%204%20Oct%202012).pdf. 
44 E.g., Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), The Seventh Mediation Audit: A Survey of 
Commercial Mediator Attitudes and Experience, CEDR (May 11, 2016), 
https://www.cedr.com/docslib/The_Seventh_Mediation_Audit_(2016).pdf (indicating an 86% aggregate success 
rate for mediation in an audit of 319 mediators in the United Kingdom). 
45 Matthew Hodgson, Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration Revisited, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Dec. 
14, 2017), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1151755/damages-and-costs-in-investment-treaty-
arbitration-revisited (last visited Aug. 24, 2019) (providing median costs and duration for cases from 2013 to 
May 2017).  These figures do not include time and costs in related actions, such as annulment proceedings.  Id.   
46 Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation: What’s the Difference?, FINDLAW, 
https://adr.findlaw.com/mediation/mediation-vs-arbitration-vs-litigation-whats-the-difference.html (last visited 
on Nov. 7, 2019). 
47 Mediation, Arbitration & Collaborative Law, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/mediation 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2019).   
48 Mediation vs. Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 46.   
49 World Bank Group, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (2019–2) 12, ICSID (June 30, 2019), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ICSID_Web_Stats_2019-2_(English).pdf (demonstrating that ICSID 
cases are commonly based on investments in the oil, gas, mining, electric power, and other energy projects). 
50 See generally Jeremy Glover, Mediation: Is it Ever Reasonable to Decline a Request to Mediate?, FENWICK 
ELLIOT (Feb. 2015), https://www.fenwickelliott.com/research-insight/articles-papers/alternative-dispute-
resolution/mediation-decline-request-mediate.   
51 World Bank Group, supra note 49, at 14 (showing that 35% of cases are discontinued or settled with 5% of 
the resulting settlement agreements reduced to arbitral awards). 
52 Lucy Reed, Suite for ISDS: Mediation, Arbitration, Appellate Bodies, 9 KOREAN ARB. REV., 58, 64 (2017).  
Professor Lucy Reed, who has 35 years of experience in investor–state dispute settlement, opines that a large 
portion of investor–state disputes whose outcomes are predictable are not settled.  Id.  According to her 
7
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institutions53 suggest that mediation could be used more often.  A more difficult 
question is why it is not.  Professor Michael Reisman answered this question 
succinctly in an article on the subject from 2011: 
 
[I]n States in which there are active political oppositions 
waiting for an opportunity to pounce on the incumbents for having 
‘betrayed’ the national patrimony by settling with an investor, 
modalities other than transparent third-party decisions can 
undermine or even bring down governments and destroy personal 
careers.54  
 
This observation, a compelling explanation on its face, has been corroborated by 
other commentators55 and has empirical support.  A 2016 report by the Centre for 
International Law at the National University of Singapore (CIL Report) found that 
states are more reluctant to settle disputes than investors and that the main reason for 
their reluctance is a preference to defer responsibility for deciding disputes to third-
party adjudicators.56  Underlying this concern is fear of allegations or prosecution for 
corruption, fear of public criticism, and fear of setting a settlement precedent that 
might encourage other investors to make claims.57  The two other main obstacles to 
settlement, according to the survey, are a breakdown of the relationship between the 
investor and state and unrealistic expectations about the outcome of the case.58 
The CIL Report can be meaningfully compared to a larger survey of 
international commercial and investment mediation, the results of which were 
published at about the same time (ICM Survey).59  While the ICM Survey did not 
focus on obstacles to mediation or investor-state mediation in particular, it did 
explore how parties engaged in international commerce and investment could be 
encouraged to attempt mediation.60  The results suggest that the most effective means 
include better dissemination of information about the effectiveness of the procedure, 
the conduct of the procedure, and the costs of the procedure.61  
                                                                                                             
experience as counsel and arbitrator, she suggests a 30–40–30 split whereby 30% of disputes could readily have 
been settled, 40% might have been settled, and 30% are unlikely to have settled.  Id.  
53 See Prevention and Amicable Resolution, supra note 7. 
54 Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR: Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID 
REV. 1, 26 (2009).  
55 See Nancy Welsh and Andrea Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 87 (2013).  Welsh and Schneider consider the decision of 
Argentina to devalue its currency to mitigate its economic crises and the arbitration claims that this engendered, 
asking, “[h]ow could the government negotiate the payment of millions of dollars to a foreign company to 
compensate it (and its domestic partners) for its economic loss when Argentina’s citizens and wholly-owned 
domestic companies clearly had lost so much more?”  Id.    
56 Chew, Reed, & Thomas, supra note 14, at 15-16.   
57 Id. at 12-14. 
58 Id. at 23-25. 
59 Strong, supra note 43, at 1973.  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 2037-38, 2079. 
8
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol20/iss1/4
 86 
Read together, these studies suggest distinct obstacles to investor-state mediation 
including accountability avoidance by government agents on one hand and a lack of 
understanding about the process, its costs, and its potential benefits on the other.62  
The factors may overlap: a state agent concerned that settlement might anger the 
public may not appreciate common features of mediation, such as confidentiality of 
the proceedings or the possibility to settle some issues while leaving other more 
sensitive claims for arbitration.63  This suggests that overcoming obstacles may 
require addressing various types of resistance from different sources.  
Nevertheless, these studies should not be considered the last word on obstacles 
to settlement in investor-state cases despite the insights that they provide.  The CIL 
Report generated only a “relatively small” sample of forty-seven responses in the 
estimation of the authors of the report themselves.64  The ICM Survey generated a 
more significant 221 responses, but the study methodology did not distinguish 
between commercial and investment disputes, and more than one-third of 
respondents reported that they did not have significant personal experience with 
international dispute resolution.65  These shortcomings encourage further empirical 
work on obstacles to mediation and means of overcoming them.  
 
PART V.   PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 
 
Whatever the source of the obstacles, the past ten years has seen measures to 
encourage the uptake of international mediation generally.66  Governments,67 public 
entities,68 and private organizations69 have taken steps to promote and facilitate the 
mediation, which has coincided with growing recognition of its potential by 
                                            
62 See generally id. 
63 Id. at 2037-38.   
64 Chew, Reed, & Thomas, supra note 14, at 6. 
65 Strong, supra note 43, at 2016-18. 
66 Strong, supra note 43, at 2037.   
67 See, e.g., European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2017 on the implementation of Directive 
2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in 
civil and commercial matters, PARL. EUR. DOC. 2066(INI) (2016) (noting the inclusion of the promotion of 
cross-border mediation of civil and commercial disputes as part of its Mediation Directive and the adoption of 
laws to facilitate international mediation by Member States).  
68 The International Finance Corporation and World Bank Group have taken a number of steps to promote 
mediation generally and international mediation particularly, including the publication of online books that 
assist client countries to adopt and integrate mediation services.  See generally WORLD BANK GROUP, 
MEDIATION SERIES: MEDIATION ESSENTIALS (2017) (ebook); NADJA ALEXANDER, MEDIATION SERIES: 
INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DESIGN WORKBOOK (2017) (ebook); NADJA ALEXANDER & FELIX 
STEFFEK, MEDIATION SERIES: MAKING MEDIATION LAW (2017) (ebook). 
69 See, e.g., ICC, Mediation Rules, ICC (2014), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-
services/mediation/mediation-rules/ (revising ICC rules for mediation); Int’l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & 
Resolution (CPR), About, CPR, https://www.cpradr.org/about (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).  The International 
Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution has undertaken a number of initiatives including an ADR guide 
for European businesses operating in Europe and an “ADR Pledge” whose subscribers, including more than 
4,000 companies and 1,500 law firms, commit to ADR principles.  Id.   
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businesses and business advisors.70  Meanwhile, dispute resolution institutions have 
improved their mediation services and have found ways to make mediation more 
attractive in international cases 71  as new institutions dedicated entirely to 
international mediation have come into being.72 
 
A. United Nations Instruments on International Mediation 
 
A watershed event in the development of international mediation occurred in 
August 2019 as forty-six states—including China, India, South Korea, and the United 
States—signed a United Nations protocol for international mediation. 73   The 
Singapore Convention supports international mediation by facilitating the 
enforcement and recognition of settlement agreements resulting from mediation and 
by harmonizing standards for relief.74  The instrument was published together with a 
revised model law for mediation (Model Law) that is available for the international 
community of states to adopt, in whole or in part, to revise and modernize their 
laws.75  
The Singapore Convention provides for relief for settlement agreements that 
result from the mediation of international commercial disputes and extends to at least 
those investment disputes that are commercial in nature.76  While “commercial” is 
not defined in the text, the working group meant for the term to be interpreted 
                                            
70 See, e.g., White & Case, 2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration 5, 
WHITE & CASE (2018), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-
international-arbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf (finding a preference increase from 34% to 50% for combining 
alternative dispute resolution with international arbitration since 2015); PwC, Global Pound Conference Series, 
Global Data Trends and Regional Differences 13, PWC (2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/forensics/gpc-
2018-pwc.pdf (reporting that 51% of those surveyed identified preventative pre-dispute or pre-escalation 
processes as central to the future of commercial dispute resolution); Int’l Mediation Inst. (IMI), 2016 
International Mediation & ADR Survey, Census of Conflict Management and Stakeholder Trends 5, IMI (2016) 
http://www.odreurope.com/assets/site/content/IMI_survey_2016.pdf (finding that across the globe, interest in 
international mediation is growing and business advisors and potential users understand mediation better). 
71 See, e.g., Singapore Int’l Mediation Ctr. (SIMC), Arb-Med-Arb, SING. INT’L MEDIATION CTR. 
http://simc.com.sg/dispute-resolution/arb-med-arb/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2020).  The SIAC-SIMC Arb-Med-Arb 
Protocol, a collaborative process under the auspices of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) 
and the SIMC that facilitates the enforcement of mediated settlement agreements.  Id.  
72 See, e.g., Florence Int’l Mediation Chamber (FIMC), About Us, FIMC, http://www.fimcmediation.com/about-
us/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).   
73 The full list of signatories can be found at List of Signatory Countries, SING. CONVENTION, 
https://www.singaporeconvention.org/official-signatories.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).  
74 G.A. Res. 73/198, supra note 12, at 4 (Dec. 20, 2018) (“If a dispute arises concerning a matter that a party 
claims was already resolved by a settlement agreement, a Party to the Convention shall allow the party to 
invoke the settlement agreement in accordance with its rules of procedure and under the conditions laid down in 
this Convention, in order to prove that the matter has already been resolved.”).  The term “recognition” was 
avoided in the text of the convention because that term is understood differently in different jurisdictions. 
Adeline Chong, Singapore Convention on Mediation, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Aug. 7, 2019), 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2019/singapore-convention-on-mediation/.   
75 See G.A. Res. 73/199 (Dec. 20, 2018).   
76 Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition 
and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 22–23 (2019). 
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broadly and consistent with the companion Model Law, which provides that 
“commercial” includes investments.77  However, states can make reservations under 
the convention that limit or foreclose this possibility by requiring the agreement of 
disputing parties before the convention will apply and by excluding settlement 
agreements to which the state, its agencies, or agents of the agencies are parties.78  
While the need for the convention has been explained by demand for greater 
certainty about the enforcement of settlement agreements resulting from mediation, 
commentators have suggested that it may have limited practical effect because 
mediated settlements result from party agreement, which bodes well for 
compliance.79  Yet the convention may have particular utility in the investor-state 
context where changes in government and policy may encourage states to renounce 
settlement agreements.  This dynamic is already visible where changes in 
governments have caused states to renege on commitments to foreign investors and 
terminate investment treaties.80  In these conditions, the Singapore Convention may 
play an important role by fortifying mediated settlement agreements with the force of 
international law. 
Regardless of its impact in practice, the Singapore Convention should lend 
greater legitimacy to international mediation and advance understanding of its 
features.  It should also place mediation and arbitration on equal footing on the 
international plane in an important sense.  The “New York Convention” for 
international arbitration, signed in 1958, facilitates the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards and is considered by many to be the motor behind the rise in 
international arbitration as well as one of the most successful international private 
law treaties ever concluded.81  The Singapore Convention offers a counterpoint for 
mediation with similar ambitions and provisions for relief. 
 
B. Promotion of Investor-State Mediation  
 
Beyond general efforts to promote international mediation, attention is being 
paid to investor-state mediation in particular with both the public and private sectors 
engaged in its promotion and in exploring its potential.  Efforts over the past decade 
include public consultations by the EU,82 practice guidelines by the Energy Charter,83 
and investor-state mediation rules published by the International Bar Association 
                                            
77 G.A. Res. 73/199, supra note 75.   
78 G.A. Res. 73/198, supra note 12, at 7–8. 
79 Strong, supra note 43, at 2051, 2055 (noting that the international legal and business communities believe it is 
more difficult to enforce agreements to mediate international commercial disputes than to enforce agreements to 
mediate domestic disputes, and that a convention supporting enforcement of international mediated settlements 
would encourage mediation in their countries).  
80 Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: 
Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?, 52 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 741, 742 (2008).   
81 United Nations, General Assembly, The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION (June 10, 1958), http://www.newyorkconvention.org/english. 
82 Prevention and Amicable Resolution, supra note 7.  
83 Energy Charter Conference, Guide on Investment Mediation, CCDEC 2016 12 INV (July 19, 2016). 
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(IBA).84  Meanwhile, ICSID’s engagement in investor-state mediation is deepening 
with recent publications, the development and implementation of investor-state 
mediation training, and proposed mediation rules available for adoption in any 
investor-state case.85 
 
VI.   COMPULSIONS TO MEDIATE IN DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
In contrast to the investor-state context, mediation has become part of the fabric 
of the legal systems of some states, including the United States of America and 
Australia, and is on the ascent in other states including India and China.86  These 
jurisdictions and others have used incentives in other states.87  Compulsions to 
mediate vary in the types of disputes covered and the consequences of 
noncompliance, while styles of mediation vary by jurisdiction.88  For the purposes of 
this article, compulsions can be grouped into three broad, overlapping categories: 
financial incentives, mandatory instruction, and mandatory mediation. 
Financial incentives are used by states to encourage parties to mediate or 
penalize parties that obstruct mediation.  Some courts waive or reduce court fees for 
parties that settle their disputes through mediation, while others withhold public 
                                            
84 Anna Joubin-Bret and Barton Legum, The IBA Rules for Investor-State Mediation, INT’L BAR ASS’N 
MEDIATION COMMITTEE (Oct. 4, 2012), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/process/IBA%20Rules%20for%20Investor-
State%20Mediation%20(Approved%20by%20IBA%20Council%204%20Oct%202012).pdf (last accessed 24 
August 2019).  These rules have been used in at least one investor-state mediation brought under a treaty.  Luke 
Eric Peterson, In an Apparent First, Investor and Host State Agree to Try Mediation Under IBA Rules to 
Resolve an Investment Treaty Dispute, IA REPORTER (April 14, 2016), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-
an-apparent-first-investor-and-host-state-agree-to-try-mediation-under-iba-rules-to-resolve-an-investment-
treaty-dispute/.  They have influenced other sets of mediation rules.  Asian Int’l Arbitration Ctr., Resolving your 
Disputes, the Asian Way - The New Mediation Rules of the Asian International Arbitration Centre (AIAC), 
AIAC (March 22, 2018), https://www.aiac.world/news/249/Resolving-your-Disputes,-the-Asian-Way-–-The-
New-Mediation-Rules-of-the-Asian-International-Arbitration-Centre-(AIAC). 
85 In greater detail, recent initiatives include an issue of the ICSID Review dedicated to alternative dispute 
resolution and primarily to mediation, a series of video interviews about investor-state mediation published on 
the ICSID website, investor-state mediator trainings with the support of CEDR, the International Mediation 
Institute, and the International Energy Charter offered in Asia, Europe, North America, and the Middle East, 
and the planned addition of new mediation rules for investor-state cases that can be applied even where the 
disputing parties have no links to ICSID member states.  See Ana Ubilava & Luke Nottage, ICSID’s New 
Mediation Rules: A Small but Positive Step Forward (August 3, 2018) (unpublished paper) (available at  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/amendments/Documents/Ubilava_Notage_10.17.2018.pdf). 
86 F. Peter Phillip, World Mediation Forum Part 2: Italy, Poland, China, India, France... and even Texas!, BUS. 
CONFLICT MGMT. (Mar. 9, 2019), http://www.businessconflictmanagement.com/blog/2019/03/world-
mediation-forum-part-2-italy-poland-china-india-france-and-even-texas/. 
87 Jonathon Rodrigues, Safeguarding the Pillars of Mediation in India, MEDIATE (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.mediate.com/articles/rodrigues-mediation-in-india.cfm.  
88 See, e.g., THE VARIEGATED LANDSCAPE OF MEDIATION, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MEDIATION 
REGULATION AND PRACTICES IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD (Manon Schonewille & F. Schonewille eds., 2014) 
(surveying different approaches); MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
(Klaus J. Hopt & Felix Steffek eds., 2012). 
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funding to parties that do not meet with a mediator.89  In several jurisdictions, judges 
are empowered to take a party’s refusal to use mediation or to attend a mediation 
information session into consideration when awarding costs.90  
Mandatory instruction aims at assuring that parties bound for the courts 
understand the mediation process and its potential benefits.91  Some jurisdictions 
require lawyers to advise parties about mediation when litigation is contemplated 92 
or enable judges to inform parties about mediation once proceedings are underway.93  
Parties may otherwise be required to attend a mandatory informational session about 
mediation conducted by a mediator or mediation service provider in the course of 
judicial proceedings.94 
There are also states that sanction mandatory mediation.95  This obligation goes 
beyond an information session with a mediator to an actual attempt to reach a 
mediated settlement, though the two may be included in the same process. 96  
Mandatory mediation may be prescribed by law as a condition to litigation97 or 
ordered by a judge who determines that mediation could offer a better result than 
ongoing court proceedings.98  
 
VII.   COMPULSIONS TO MEDIATE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES 
 
The many ways that domestic legal systems have found to compel parties to 
mediate beg the question whether incentives or compulsions should be used to 
                                            
89 Giuseppe De Pali, Ashley Feasley & Flavia Orecchini, Quantifying the Cost of Not Using Mediation - A Data 
Analysis, PARL. EUR. DOC. PE 453.180 19 (2011), accessible at 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201105/20110518ATT19592/20110518ATT19592EN
.pdf. 
90 E.g., Achieving a Balanced Relationship Between Mediation and Judicial Proceedings, The Implementation 
of the Mediation Directive, PARL. EUR. DOC PE 571.395 11-12 (2016), accessible at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/571395/IPOL_IDA%282016%29571395_EN.pdf 
[hereinafter Achieving a Balanced Relationship]. 
91 Id. at 12.  
92 E.g., Mediation Act 2017 (Act No. 27/2017) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2017/act/27/enacted/en/html.  The act states that solicitors must advise their 
clients to consider mediation and provide them with “information in respect of mediation services” and 
information about “the advantages of resolving the dispute otherwise than by way of the proposed proceedings, 
and… the benefits of mediation” while a “statutory declaration” that a solicitor has complied with this provision 
must be filed when court proceedings are issued, and the court may adjourn the proceedings if the statutory 
declaration is not filed.  Id. at §§ 14(1)-(3). 
93 Id., at §16(1)(b). 
94 Achieving a Balanced Relationship, supra note 90, at 16; e.g., Czech Republic and Italy for certain civil and 
commercial disputes and in Lithuania, Luxemburg, and the United Kingdom for family law disputes.  Id. 
95 Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 368, 373 (2001).   
96 Id. at 384.  
97 E.g., The Commercial Courts Act, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts 
(Amendment) Act, 2018, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 2018 (India), at §12A (requiring commercial disputes be 
submitted to mediation in India before being brought in court if it does not require immediate interim relief). 
98 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 652 (2012).  Whereby “[a]ny district court that elects to require the use of alternative 
dispute resolution in certain cases may do so only with respect to mediation, early neutral evaluation, and, if the 
parties’ consent, arbitration.”  Id. 
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promote investor-state mediation.99  If fear of political reprisal is a predominant 
obstacle, government agents may reject mediation out of hand and press forward 
with expensive and lengthy arbitration proceedings against the best interests of their 
constituents, who will ultimately bear the costs of any adverse award.100  A better 
understanding of the mediation process and its benefits may not be enough to change 
this situation.  Although mediation is not appropriate for every dispute, 
accountability of government agents for refusing to mediate, introduced in treaties or 
dispute-resolution practice, might be useful to ensure that mediation is given serious 
consideration as an alternative or complement to arbitration.101  
 
A. Treaty Practice  
 
The most natural source for any provisions that may compel or encourage 
mediation is in investment treaties themselves.  International investment treaties have 
long included provisions that require disputing parties to take time to cool off before 
initiating arbitration proceedings, but in recent years, an increasing number of 
investment instruments have gone further. The Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive 
Partnership Agreement provides that a respondent state can compel mandatory 
conciliation against a claimant investor.102  Other treaties identify mediation as an 
option during the cooling-off period or make general provisions for mediation.103  In 
                                            
99 Some commentators have considered the use of compulsory measures in their work.  Welsh & Schneider, 
supra note 55, at 87; Lisa Bingham, Opportunities for Dispute Systems Design in Investment Treaty Disputes: 
Consensual Dispute Resolution at Varying Levels, in INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION-II 33 (Susan D. Frank & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2011), 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf; Wolf von Kumberg, Making Mediation Mainstream: An 
Application for Investment Treaty Disputes, in INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND ALTERNATIVES 
TO ARBITRATION-II 71 ( Susan D. Frank & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2011), 
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf. 
100 While the issue of accountability avoidance is not unique to investor-state mediation, it may be especially 
pronounced in this sector.  Agents in commercial disputes may face greater countervailing accountability from 
partners or shareholders concerned more about the financial outcome than how a decision to settle may be 
perceived.  Welsh & Schneider, supra note 55, at 87.   
101 To elaborate this point, while a government official may reason there is little to lose by leaving the  
resolution of a dispute to an arbitral tribunal, this thinking might change if there were possible legal or financial 
consequences analogous to those in domestic systems.  An obligation to attempt mediation, or compulsions in 
that direction, would give the official the necessary political cover for entering into settlement negotiations and 
avoid any suggestion of weakness by the state.  Once engaged in the process, the official might see a benefit in 
a mediated settlement to some or all claims or at least become more familiar with the process and its potential 
benefits.  Id.   
102 Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement art. 14.23(1), Indon.-Austl., Mar. 4, 2019, 
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/not-yet-in-force/iacepa/iacepa-text/Pages/iacepa-chapter-14-
investment.aspx. 
103International Investment Agreements Navigator, INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/iia-mapping (last visited Aug. 24, 
2019) (suggesting that about 28% of treaties signed since 2010 provide for mediation).  These percentages were 
determined by utilizing filters and finding 50 out of the 181 IIAs signed since 2010 included either a voluntary 
or compulsory ADR clause (conciliation or mediation).  Some notable examples include the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and side instruments between New Zealand, on one 
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a few instances, treaties provide rules of procedure to support the mediation 
process.104 
An approach with broader ambitions would be the promulgation of a multilateral 
treaty that facilitates investor-state mediation.  One model for such an instrument is 
the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Arbitration (Mauritius Convention), which effectively alters the dispute resolution 
clauses of existing investment treaties to provide for greater transparency while also 
enabling contracting states to tailor their preferences through reservations.105  A 
similar approach might be taken to introduce incentives to mediate or compulsory 
mediation procedures into existing investment treaties.  
An advantage of the use of treaties is that it enables contracting states to set any 
compulsory provisions on their own terms, which would pay greater due to party 
autonomy than compulsion by institutions and arbitrators.106  Under this approach, 
the decision to mediate is taken by treaty negotiators who are normally removed 
from the type of personal concerns that government agents facing claims by investors 
may experience.107  Treaty means would also benefit from scale.  While an arbitrator 
suggesting mediation to disputing parties might generate some attention from 
commentators, as with Achmea, the impact of a treaty that prioritizes mediation or 
that makes mediation a pre-condition to arbitration has the potential to bring about 
                                                                                                             
hand, and Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, on the other, which added the requirement for state consent to 
arbitration after mandatory negotiation that may include mediation.  Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership text and resources, NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-
and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text/#side (last visited Aug. 24, 2019).  Mainland and 
Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), China-H.K., Sept. 29, 2003, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2657/download; 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-Can., Oct. 30, 2016, (noting the attention to defining the 
mediation process).  An interesting early example of compulsion to mediate can be found in the Common 
Marker for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Common Investment Area, presently under revision, 
which establishes mediation as the default dispute resolution procedure absent party agreement to an alternative. 
Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area art. 26(4), May 23, 2007, 
https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkit-for-trade-negotiators/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf. 
104 E.g., Free Trade Agreement art.3.31, EU-Viet., Oct. 17, 2018, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157337.pdf; Free Trade Agreement art. 3.4, EU-
Sing., Oct. 19, 2018, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7972-2018-REV-1/en/pdf.  
105 United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Mar. 17, 2015, 22 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention of Transparency].   
106 Welsh & Schneider, supra note 55, at 71 (discussing the incorporation of mediation provisions in investment 
treaties, including a compulsory information session as provisioned in domestic laws); see Report of the 
Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States 43, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID_Conv%20Reg%20Rules_EN_2003.pdf (observing 
that consent to jurisdiction by investors and states under the dispute resolution clause of an investment 
agreement will be found in different instruments, for instance in a dispute resolution clause of a treaty for the 
state and in the request to initiate proceedings under that clause for the investor). 
107 Welsh & Schneider, supra note 55, at 93 n.75.   
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cultural change and serve as a model for states that resolve to introduce provisions 
for mediation in their investment treaties.   
 
B. Dispute-Resolution Practice  
 
Outside of investment treaties, dispute resolution practice offers additional 
opportunities to compel parties to mediate.  ICSID and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, which administer most investor-state arbitrations, could play an 
important role in encouraging or compelling parties to mediate.  Meanwhile, dispute-
resolution institutions seeking to attract investor-state cases could promote investor-
state mediation as part of their growth strategies.  Drawing on the experience of 
domestic courts and commercial arbitration practice, institutions could encourage 
investor-state mediation by: 
- publishing model clauses that provide for mediation, mediation as a pre-
condition to arbitration, and concurrent mediation-arbitration proceedings, 
- advising parties in arbitration proceedings on mediation services within or 
outside of the institution, 
- assuring ease of transfer of cases from arbitration to mediation within the 
institution or to third-party mediation providers through adapted procedures, 
- provisioning financial incentives for transferring cases from arbitration to 
mediation by refunding arbitration lodging fees, waiving mediation lodging 
fees, or adjusting administrative fees, 
- obligating tribunals and parties to seek to resolve disputes efficiently and in a 
cost-efficient manner in institutional rules (which may, for instance, empower 
arbitrators to identify claims suitable for mediation or take obstructions to 
mediation into account when apportioning costs), 
- publishing information about the potential advantages of mediation over 
arbitration in the investor-state context, and  
- publishing information, anonymized where necessary, about investor-state 
mediations that the institution has administered.108  
 
Arbitrators could likewise compel parties to mediate or otherwise set a general 
expectation that parties should not refuse mediation unreasonably when it is 
proposed.  The authority to take such measures could already be derived from the 
rules of many institutions.109  Depending on the circumstances of a case, arbitrators 
could employ measures such as:  
                                            
108 While these measures are directed at investor-state mediation, they could of course be adopted to promote 
international mediation more generally. See generally E.g., Klaus Peter Berger & J. Ole Jensen, The 
Arbitrator’s Mandate To Facilitate Settlement, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 887, 892-93 (2017); ICSID Convention 
art. 44. Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S 159 (“If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this 
Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.”).   
109 E.g., id. (“If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or 
any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.”).  This might eventually be read together 
with revised ICSID rules on efficiency discussed in later in this section.  Id.   
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- identifying cases or individual claims that are suitable for mediation, 
- reminding parties to consider mediation of their dispute at various points 
throughout the arbitration proceedings, and 
- shifting costs onto a party that obstructs mediation or that unreasonably refuses 
a proposal to mediate proposed by an opposing party or the tribunal.110 
 
C. “Hardening” Efficiency Obligations 
 
The timing may be particularly favorable to consider how compulsions to 
mediate that have become standard in some domestic legal systems might be used in 
the ISDS system.  In October 2018, the IBA published a report on consistency, 
efficiency, and transparency in investment-treaty arbitration that suggests the 
revision of investment treaties to encourage disputants to use alternative dispute 
resolution techniques.111  The report concludes that investment treaties should make 
clear that “disputants should resort to international arbitration only after they are 
convinced that negotiations and various forms of alternative dispute settlement 
techniques would not be successful.”112  The following month, a United Nations 
working group tasked with considering ISDS reform concluded that changes to the 
system are needed and that mediation could be used as an alternative to arbitration to 
address user concerns about procedural cost and duration.113 
These high-profile pronouncements on the use of mediation to resolve investor-
state disputes efficiently come at a time when efficiency obligations are increasingly 
imposed by dispute-resolution institutions.114  In 2016, the ICC Court of Arbitration 
announced a policy of penalizing arbitrators who unjustifiably delay the release of 
their awards after proceedings have closed.115  Other institutions obligate parties and 
tribunals to ensure that proceedings are efficient in the institutional arbitration rules 
themselves, including the proposed ICSID rules of procedure for arbitration,116 
mediation, 117  and conciliation. 118   Some institutions have also built specific 
                                            
110 While such financial penalties might come too late to promote mediation in such cases in which they are 
applied, the effect may encourage parties in future disputes to mediate.  See generally id. 
111 Int’l Bar Ass’n, Report (IBA), Consistency, Efficiency and Transparency in Investment Treaty Arbitration 11 
n. 41 (2018), 
https://www.ibanet.org/Search/Search.aspx?query=consistency,%20efficiency%20and%20transparency. 
112 Id.  
113 Possible Reform, supra note 7, at §§ 100-101 (proposing “[d]ispute resolution using means other than 
arbitration such as mediation, ombudsman facilities”).  
114 ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 
JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 110 (2017).   
115 ICC, ICC Court Announces New Policies to Foster Transparency and Ensure Greater Efficiency, ICC (May 
1, 2016), https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-court-announces-new-policies-to-foster-
transparency-and-ensure-greater-efficiency.   
116 ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 32 (Working Paper #3, Vol. 1, Aug. 2019), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/WP_3_VOLUME_1_ENGLISH.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Proposed 
Rules]. 
117 Id. at 219. 
118 Id. at 175. 
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procedures into their rules that favor efficiency and that can be applied absent party 
agreement, including provisions for institutional consolidation of arbitrations119 and 
the appointment of a sole arbitrator rather than a tribunal of three.120  
In a notable parallel to this trend, in December 2018, a set of procedural and 
evidentiary rules aimed at efficiency were published following a decade of 
preparatory work. 121   The Rules on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in 
International Arbitration (Prague Rules) seek to achieve greater efficiency in 
arbitration by offering an alternative to the pervasive IBA Rules on the Taking of 
Evidence in International Arbitration. 122   The Prague Rules contain myriad 
provisions that favor efficiency and that empower arbitrators to take a proactive role 
in managing cases to ensure efficiency.123  The rules notably authorize tribunals to 
decide what evidence parties can submit and direct arbitrators to “assist the parties in 
reaching an amicable settlement of the dispute at any stage of the arbitration.”124  By 
their terms, the Prague Rules may be applied by tribunals on their own initiative 
absent party agreement.125  
The pronouncements by the IBA and UNCITRAL, expanding provisions on 
efficiency in institutional rules, and the publication of the Prague Rules all 
demonstrate a shift in attitudes about efficiency in international dispute resolution 
proceedings.  Efficiency is increasingly recognized not merely as a worthy goal, but 
as a procedural imperative that can be imposed on parties.  These developments, 
taken together, evidence a trend that may favor incentives and compulsions to 
mediate investor-state disputes since mediation may offer significant advantages over 
arbitration in terms of cost and time efficiency.   
 
VIII.  POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH COMPULSIONS 
 
A. Practical Concerns  
 
Despite the potential benefits of the measures considered, compulsions to 
mediate face significant objections.126  The more robust the incentive or compulsion, 
the more likely that such measure may be considered an infringement on party 
                                            
119 E.g., H. K. Int’l Arbitration Ctr., 2018 Administered Arbitration Rules, at art. 35, HKIAC (2018), 
https://www.hkiac.org/sites/default/files/ck_filebrowser/PDF/arbitration/2018_hkiac_rules.pdf. 
120 E.g., ICC, Arbitration Rules arts. 21, 35,71, ICC (March 1, 2017), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-
services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/. 
121 Working Group from Civil Law Countries, Rules on the Efficient Conduct of Proceedings in International 
Arbitration (Prague Rules), (Draft 1 Sept. 2018), 
http://praguerules.com/upload/medialibrary/d29/d292354280e8ebc119bbe1ff49027b65.pdf [hereinafter Prague 
Rules]. 
122 Id. at 2.  
123 Id. at 4.  
124 Id. at 10.  
125 Id. at 4. 
126 Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-
Mandated Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 480 (2010). 
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autonomy or even a denial of access to justice where the investor seeks to proceed 
directly to arbitration.127  Although investment mediation may be comparatively 
efficient, it remains an “investment” in time and money with uncertain results.128  
The process is not appropriate for every dispute and singling out and elevating 
mediation could crowd out other processes that are better suited to a given dispute, 
such as expert evaluation or adjudication, or that are amenable to the disputing 
parties.129  
Compulsions to mediate may also prove counterproductive given that they do 
not ensure good-faith participation in the mediation process.  An investor or state 
could go through the motions of a mediation without any genuine intention to settle 
the dispute.  Mediation can even be a means to obtain compromising information that 
can be used against a party in arbitration.130  Although many mediation laws include 
rules on the admissibility of evidence in other proceedings to cope with this concern, 
the information obtained during a mediation can help to shape adversarial strategy 
and, in some cases, lead to evidence that is admissible.131 
 
B. Treaty Practice 
 
Beyond these practical concerns, there are specific obstacles to compulsions that 
are stipulated in treaties.  Even where the will exists among contracting states, there 
are more than 3,000 investment treaties already in force, which limits instances 
where such provisions might be added to new treaties.132  While it is possible to 
renegotiate existing treaties to provide for mediation, it is unlikely that an awakening 
to the potential benefits of mediation alone would be sufficient incentive for states to 
enter into the often complex and politically-sensitive process of treaty 
renegotiation.133  Although the conclusion of a large multilateral investment treaty 
with compulsory mediation provisions could have a significant impact, the prospect 
is limited because such treaties are not commonly concluded.134  
                                            
127 Sunday A. Fagbemi, The Doctrine of Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Myth or 
Reality?, 6 J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 222, 239 (2015). 
128 Possible Reform, supra note 7, at § 95. 
129 Id. at § 100, 101. 
130 E.g., UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement 
Agreements Resulting from Mediation art. 11 (2018), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-
documents/uncitral/en/annex_ii.pdf.   
131 Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation 
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 MO. L. J. OF 
DISP. RESOL. 1, 3-4 (1995). 
132 ICSID, Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx (last visited Oct. 
29, 2019). 
133 Esme Shirlow, The Rising Interest in Mediation of Investment Treaty Disputes, and Scope for Increasing 
Interaction between Mediation and Arbitration, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (September 29, 2016), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/09/29/the-rising-interest-in-the-mediation-of-investment-
treaty-disputes-and-scope-for-increasing-interaction-between-mediation-and-arbitration/. 
134 Id.  
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A multilateral instrument with the purpose of introducing mediation provisions 
into existing treaties, on the model of the Mauritius Convention, would face different 
challenges.135  The mere existence of such a treaty would not ensure wide adoption, 
and the initiative could set back ongoing efforts to promote investor-state mediation 
were it to fail.136  Meanwhile, choices would have to be made about what incentives 
or obligations to include in the instrument and about the results of non-compliance: if 
the provisions did not go far enough, the instrument would be ineffective, and if they 
went too far, this would discourage ratification.137 
 
C. Dispute Resolution Practice 
 
Although any number of compulsory procedures might be introduced into 
dispute resolution practice, it is easy to understand why they are not common.  While 
institutions have different philosophies about the appropriate role to play in case 
management, even the most ardent supporters of mediation among them would resist 
pressing parties too hard to mediate for both policy and commercial reasons.138  
Competition for cases including investor-state disputes is growing, 139 and parties can 
avoid institutions that they consider to be too heavy-handed in case management.140 
Arbitrators, for their part, have little short-term financial incentive to encourage 
disputing parties to abandon arbitration for mediation.141   They will also quite 
naturally tend to avoid behavior that could discourage future appointments or lead to 
challenges of their awards, which might be triggered by perceived interference with 
party autonomy.142  The Achmea tribunal may have had this in mind as it counseled 
                                            
135 Nathalie Bravo, The Mauritius Convention on Transparency and the Multilateral Tax Instrument: models for 
the modification of treaties? 25 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 85, 102 (2018), 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/diaeia2018d5a5_en.pdf.  
136 Id. at 106.  
137 Id. at 102. 
138 Phillip S. Cottone, Top 10 Specious Reasons Why Lawyers Won’t Mediate, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, 
https://www.nar.realtor/about-nar/policies/top-10-specious-reasons-why-lawyers-wont-mediate (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2019).  
139 In order to attract investor-state cases, some institutions known for administering commercial arbitrations 
have published investor-state arbitration rules including CIETAC (Arbitration Rules of the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for International Investment Disputes) and SIAC (Investment 
Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre).  See also China International Economic 
and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), Arbitration Rules, CIETAC (2015), 
http://www.cietac.org/Uploads/201904/5caae5be03bb5.pdf.  Singapore Int’l Arbitration Ctr. (SIAC), SIAC 
Rules 2016, SING. INT’L ARB. CTR. (2016), http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2016#Top. 
140 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative 
Mediation, and What It Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 111, 113–16 (2002).   
141 See Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and Settlement: Empirical Insights 
into the Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 8 (2014). 
142 But see Berger & Jensen, supra note 108; White & Case, supra note 70, at 6-7 (reporting instances of 
arbitrators from Switzerland, Germany, and Austria promoting alternative dispute resolution in the course of 
arbitration proceedings). 
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the parties about mediation, emphasizing that it was not the tribunal’s role to “get 
involved in this in any way at all” as regards the election to mediate.143   
 
D. Timing and Rationale  
 
There are also issues related to timing and justifications for compulsions.  While 
the CIL Report and ICM Survey provide important insights, both surveys have 
empirical limits,144 and the findings leave open questions.145  It is particularly unclear 
how a better appreciation of the legitimacy of mediation as a process and a better 
understanding of the potential benefits of mediation by disputing parties, government 
agents, and the stakeholders who hold government agents accountable, might bear on 
concerns about accountability by government agents.146  
It would also be mistaken to consider compulsions to mediate in domestic legal 
systems to be a perfect analog for the investor-state context.  The use of compulsory 
mediation in the EU has yielded mixed results.147  Meanwhile the obstacles to 
mediation and underlying rationale for compulsions are distinctive in the investor-
state context.148  One would be forgiven, amidst the uncertainty, for concluding that 
present efforts should focus on expanding mediator training, reporting successful 







                                            
143 Achmea, PCA Case No. 2008-13, § 60. 
144 Chew, Reed, & Thomas, supra note 14, at 6 (generating only a small sample, in estimation of author, of 47 
responses); Strong, supra note 43, at 2018 (generating 221 responses but more than one-third did not have 
significant personal experience with international dispute resolution and, perhaps more critically, the 
methodology and questions of the ICM survey did not distinguish between commercial and investment 
disputes). 
145 See generally Chew, Reed, & Thomas, supra note 14, at 6; Strong, supra note 43, at 2018.  Further 
scholarship is needed, for instance, on incentives to encourage mediation, the potential impacts of compulsory 
elements on obstacles to investor-state mediation, and how the style of mediation, formality of the process, and 
degree of transparency might affect obstacles.   
146 See Federal Interagency ADR Working Group Steering Committee, A Guide for Federal Employee 
Mediators, IADRWG (May 9, 2006), https://www.adr.gov/pdf/final_manual.pdf.  
147 E.g., CARLOS ESPLUGUES, Civil and Commercial Mediation in the E.U. after the transposition of the 
Directive 2008/52/EC on Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, in CIVIL & COMMERCIAL MEDIATION IN 
EUROPE: CROSS-BORDER MEDIATION 485-771 (2014). 
148 See Giuseppe Di Palo, A Ten-Year-Long “EU Mediation Paradox” When an EU Directive Needs To Be 
More...Directive, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Nov. 21, 2018), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_BRI%282018%29608847. 
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IX.   CONCLUSION 
 
Robert Browning said, “[m]y sun sets to rise again.”150  Proponents of investor-
state mediation likewise have reason to see renewed possibility to achieve today what 
was impossible to achieve yesterday.  The ISDS system was built on the assumption 
that disputing parties would prefer conciliation.  While those expectations went 
unrealized as arbitration rose to prominence, in recent years institutions, users, and 
academics have observed that facilitated negotiation could play a greater role in 
resolving investor-state disputes. 151   The initiatives considered in this paper 
demonstrate that these views are gaining traction and are beginning to shape policy 
and dispute resolution systems. 
Yet investor-state mediation remains uncommon and ambivalence among 
disputing parties runs deep.  The reasons include a lack of understanding of the 
process and a reluctance by state officials to shoulder political responsibility for 
mediated settlements potentially perceived as disadvantageous to the public interest.  
The most straightforward way to overcome these obstacles, where the will exists, is 
internally in investment treaties through provisions that prioritize mediation or that 
make mediation a pre-condition to arbitration.  Given that more than 3,000 treaties 
with investment protections are currently in force, broad change might nevertheless 
be difficult to achieve absent a multilateral instrument that extends the scope of 
mediation provisions to existing treaties as the Mauritius Convention does for 
transparency.152 
External compulsions by institutions and arbitrators could be used to encourage 
parties to consider mediation more seriously and begin chipping away at any 
reluctance of government officials to mediate by matching their accountability 
avoidance with countervailing accountability for decisions not to mediate.  Such 
measures, which have proven successful in domestic jurisdictions, might also lend 
greater legitimacy to mediation through the affirmation by institutions and arbitrators 
of the potential benefits of mediation.153 
With these observations in mind, a package of measures to promote mediation to 
greater effect that would engage various stakeholders could include: 
- by states, prioritization of mediation in new investment treaties and renegotiated 
treaties (including, for example, mandatory mediation information sessions or 
compulsory mediation absent opt-out); 
- by dispute-resolution institutions, facilitation of concurrent arbitration and 
mediation proceedings, and the transfer of cases from arbitration to mediation 
                                            
150 Robert Browning Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/robert_browning_149534 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
151 Prevention and Amicable Resolution, supra note 7, at 7. 
152 OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Kazakhstan 2017, OECD ILIBRARY 
(2017), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264269606-en. 
153 Generation Ukraine, ICSID CASE No. ARB/00/9, at ¶ 6.9(i).   
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with adapted procedures and financial incentives (such as waiver of filing fees 
for transferred or concurrent cases and non-cumulative administrative fees); 
- by arbitrators, identification to parties of disputes or claims suitable for 
mediation, and cost-shifting to account for a party’s obstruction of mediation or 
unreasonable refusal to mediate; and  
- by service providers (or institutions), educational initiatives including 
informational sessions to discuss the benefits of mediation with disputing 
parties, as well as potential and existing contracting states to investment treaties. 
 
Internal and external compulsions from diverse and respected sources may 
contribute to changing the prevailing paradigm that situates arbitration at the center 
of ISDS, and that undervalues mediation.  The timing for a paradigm shift is 
opportune as investor-state mediation gains currency with the inclusion of mediation 
provisions in recent investment treaties, the signing of the Singapore Convention, 
investor-state mediation trainings, and recent pronouncements by the IBA and 
UNCITRAL that encourage the use of mediation in place of arbitration to resolve 
investor-state disputes.154  Incentives and compulsions such as those considered in 
this article might contribute to make investor-state mediation more common and 
perhaps produce a few “diamonds” in the process. 
                                            
154 See Schnabel, supra note 76, at 2; Strong, supra note 43, at 1983. 
23
Claxton: Compelling Parties to Mediate Investor-State Disputes
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2020
